Doubling Down On A Billion Dollar Blind Spot: Women Business Owners and Tax Reform by Bruckner, Caroline
American University Business Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 1 Article 1 
2020 
Doubling Down On A Billion Dollar Blind Spot: Women Business 
Owners and Tax Reform 
Caroline Bruckner 
American University Kogod School of Business, cbruck@american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aublr 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons, Law and Gender Commons, and the Tax Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruckner, Caroline "Doubling Down On A Billion Dollar Blind Spot: Women Business Owners and Tax 
Reform," American University Business Law Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (2020) . 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/aublr/vol9/iss1/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews 
at Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
American University Business Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ American University 
Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 
1DOUBLING DOWN ON A BILLION
DOLLAR BLIND SPOT: WOMEN
BUSINESS OWNERS AND TAX REFORM
CAROLINE BRUCKNER*
I. Introduction ................................................................................................1
II. Women Business Owners as an Economic Force .....................................8
A. Most Women-Owned Firms Are Small Business Service
Firms............................................................................................9
B. Women-Owned Firms Still Encounter Growth and Access to
Capital Challenges.....................................................................13
III. Data on Women Testifying Before the Tax-Writing Committees.........16
IV. TCJA & Small Business Tax Expenditures...........................................21
A. Section 199A – Qualified Business Income Deduction...............21
B. Section 179 – Accelerated Depreciation for Investments in
Tangible Property for Small Businesses....................................28
V. Congressional Action Post-TCJA...........................................................30
VI. Conclusion.............................................................................................32
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1976, the U.S. Census Bureau (“Census”) released its first ever report
on the state of women’s business ownership in the United States (“U.S.”)
that counted 402,025 women-owned U.S. firms representing only 4.6
percent of all firms and 0.3 percent of all U.S. business receipts, as of
* Caroline Bruckner is a tax professor on the faculty of American University Kogod
School of Business (KSB) and is the managing director of the Kogod Tax Policy
Center. Prior to joining KSB in 2015, she worked for the U.S. Senate Committee on
Small Business and Entrepreneurship (SBC) from 2009 through 2014, ultimately as
Chief Counsel. Before public service, Bruckner was a tax lawyer in private practice
with PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP – Washington National Tax Services and
PaulHastings LLP. Bruckner is grateful to Amadea Anile (WCL’20) and Ben Begas
(AU’20) for their extensive work on the congressional witness dataset included in this
article.
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1972.
1
Concerned by these low figures, U.S. Commerce Secretary, Dr.
Juanita Kreps, a labor economist, advised President Carter to investigate
the circumstances behind the numbers.
2
On August 4, 1977, Carter issued
a memorandum creating an Interagency Task Force on Women Business
Owners (“Task Force”) to (i) identify and assess the adequacy of existing
data on women entrepreneurs; and (ii) assess current federal programs and
practices that have the effect of discriminating against women
entrepreneurs or placing them at a competitive disadvantage.
3
In November 1977, the Task Force established its membership and got to
work.
4
High-level representatives from eight federal agencies served on
the Task Force and contributed to its findings.
5
In conducting its review,
the Task Force not only identified the many challenges women
entrepreneurs face, but also focused on small businesses, “since this is the
business sector in which most women-owned businesses are
concentrated.”
6
While recognizing that minority women business owners
were subject to “double barriers of racism and sexism,” the Task Force
primarily attacked sexism, rationalizing that alleviating this significant
problem would aid in the discrimination faced by minority women.
7
As
part of this exercise, the U.S. Department of Treasury (“Treasury”)
1. CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KOGOD TAX POLICY CTR. REPORT, BILLION DOLLAR
BLIND SPOT: HOW THE U.S. TAX CODE’S SMALL BUSINESS EXPENDITURES IMPACT
WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERS 6 (2017) [hereinafter BDBS], https://www.american.edu/
kogod/research/upload/blind_spot_accessible.pdf (citing INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON
WOMEN BUS. OWNERS, THE BOTTOM LINE: UNEQUAL ENTERPRISE IN AMERICA 32
(1978) [hereinafter THE BOTTOM LINE]) (explaining that the 1972 Census data served
as a “valuable benchmark” despite issues with methodology and age).
2. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing BURTON I. KAUFMAN, THE CARTER YEARS
273 (2006)).
3. Id. (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 3); see also Memorandum on
Task Force on Women Business Owners to the Sec’y of the Treasury, the Sec’y of
Def., the Sec’y of Labor, the Sec’y of Commerce, the Sec’y of Health, Educ., and
Welfare, the Adm’r of Gen. Servs. Admin., the Adm’r of Small Bus. Admin. 1429
(Aug. 4, 1977).
4. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing THEBOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 3).
5. Id. (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 3); U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE,
WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERSHIP: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY 10 (1986) [hereinafter
ANNOTATEDBIBLIOGRAPHY].
6. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 3, 32, 34);
ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 5, at 5.
7. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 3–4);
Jimmy Carter, The First 18 Months: A Status Report of the Carter Administration
Action on International Women’s Year Resolutions (Sept. 4, 1978), https://www.jimmy
carterlibrary.gov/digital_library/sso/148878/90/SSO_148878_090_12.pdf (noting that
minority women face the same barrier of sexism as all women and all
recommendations of the National Plan of Action shall apply “equally and fully to
minority women”).
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prepared a report for the Task Force (the “1978 Treasury Study”) that
“concentrated on small business because the majority of women-owned
businesses are small businesses” and focused its work on “credit and
capital formation as well as other financially-related issues such as
insurance, bonding and taxation.”
8
With respect to its assessment of the impact of tax on women-owned
firms, the 1978 Treasury Study noted at the outset that tax laws were “sex
neutral” and focused its work on describing tax provisions impacting small
business.
9
Fundamentally, the 1978 Treasury Study assumed that “[o]f
course, taxation is not sex-specific. A small business is taxed as a business,
not as female- versus male-owned. As a consequence, any changes in tax
laws to benefit small businesses would benefit men more than women,
since so few businesses are owned by women.”
10
And that was that.
Since then, women-owned firms, which Census defines as businesses in
which women own 51 percent or more of the equity or stock,
11
have grown
to approximately thirteen million businesses representing 42 percent of all
U.S. firms as of 2019.
12
During this period of extraordinary growth,
Congress has supported women’s business ownership by passing
legislation designed to eliminate discriminatory lending practices and
promote federal contracting and counseling opportunities for women
business owners.
13
8. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 62, 66–
67); U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, CREDIT AND CAPITAL FORMATION: A REPORT TO THE
PRESIDENT’S INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON WOMEN BUSINESS OWNERS, at v (1978)
[hereinafter 1978 TREASURY STUDY], https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/title/credit-capital-
formation-256 (last visited Apr. 21, 2020).
9. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 (citing THE BOTTOM LINE, supra note 1, at 17);
Telephone Interview with Theodora K. Watts, author of 1978 Treasury Report (May
15, 2017) (on file with author).
10. 1978 TREASURY STUDY, supra note 8, at 86. In fact, the 1978 Treasury Study
ultimately concluded that women-owned firms had even lower income than small
businesses generally, and as a result, would not significantly benefit from major tax
reform, but that tax simplification could lower costs of tax compliance. Id at 96.
11. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS AND SELF-EMPLOYED
PERSONS (SBO) (2012), https://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/sbo/technical-
documentation/methodology.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2020).
12. AMERICAN EXPRESS, THE 2019 STATE OF WOMEN-OWNED BUSINESSES REPORT
3 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 AMERICAN EXPRESS REPORT], https://about.
americanexpress.com/files/doclibrary/file/2019-state-of-women-owned-businesses-
report.pdf.
13. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 n.13 (citing Equal Credit Opportunity Act of
1974, Pub. L. No. 93–495, 88 Stat. 1500 (1974) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691–1691f)
(outlawing discrimination based on sex or marital status in credit determinations);
Women’s Business Ownership Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100–533, 102 Stat. 2689
(1988) (supporting women small business ownership and establishing the National
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At the same time, Congress has regularly worked to enhance the U.S.
Internal Revenue Code as amended (the “IRC” or the “Code”) to benefit
small businesses on a number of fronts.
14
Most recently, in December
2017, Congress passed major tax reform legislation (commonly referred to
as the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” or “TCJA”),
15
which policymakers intended
to provide, inter alia, “tax relief for middle-class families . . . [and] tax
relief for businesses, especially small businesses.”
16
Specifically,
policymakers intended, inter alia, to “enhance unprecedented expensing for
Women’s Business Council); Women’s Business Development Act of 1991, Pub. L.
No. 102–191, 105 Stat. 1589 (1991) (championing women-owned business with federal
contracting and women’s business centers); Women’s Business Centers Sustainability
Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106–165, 113 Stat. 1795 (1999) (encouraging women-owned
businesses federal contracting and reauthorizing Women’s Business Program); SBA
Reauthorization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106–554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (authorizing
the Women-Owned Small Business Federal Contract Assistance Program, which is a
set-aside program for women-owned businesses for federal contracts); Small Business
Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010) (assisting women’s
business centers)).
14. BDBS, supra note 1, at 6 n.14 (citing Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980,
Pub. L. No. 96–605, 94 Stat. 3521 (allowing taxpayers to amortize startup costs over a
period of 5 years); Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97–34, 95 Stat.
172 (1981) (replacing the 1958 small business expensing provision with a $5,000
maximum spending allowance); Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–514, 100
Stat. 2085 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) (overhauling
the U.S. tax code for the first time since 1954); Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103–66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (raising small business expensing allowance
to $17,500 and establishing capital gains exclusion for investments into qualified small
business manufacturing corporations); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108–357, 118 Stat. 1418 (2004) (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1986)
(allowing taxpayers to deduct up to $5,000 in startup costs in the year the business
begins); Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111–240, 124 Stat. 2504 (2010)
(increasing the expensing limits for Sec. 179; temporarily increased the amount of
startup costs a taxpayer could deduct from $5,000 to $10,000; temporarily increased to
100% the exclusion from tax the capital gains from investments into qualified small
business stock under Sec. 1202); Protecting Americans from Tax Hikes Act of 2015,
Pub. L. No. 114–113, 129 Stat. 2242 (making permanent 100 percent exclusion from
tax the capital gains from investments into qualified small business stock under Sec.
1202); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., S. PRT. 114-31, TAX EXPENDITURES: COMPENDIUM OF
BACKGROUND MATERIAL ON INDIVIDUAL PROVISIONS 53 (2016), https://www.
gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-114SPRT24030/pdf/CPRT-114SPRT24030.pdf).
15. Pub. L. No. 115–97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2018) (amending the Internal Revenue
Code).
16. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Treasury, Unified Framework for Fixing Our
Broken Tax Code (Sept. 27, 2017) [hereinafter Unified Framework], https://www.trea
sury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Tax-Framework.pdf; see also Stephen
J. Pieklik et al., Deducting Success: Congressional Policy Goals and the Tax Cuts and
Jobs Act of 2017, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 6–7 (2018) (summarizing goals set forth in a
policy framework prepared by the Trump Administration and the congressional tax-
writing committees included in the Unified Framework).
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business investments, especially to provide relief for small businesses.”
17
The final legislation included a number of “special income tax provisions”
designated as “tax expenditures” intended to alleviate tax burdens on
individuals with business income as well as additional investments in
existing small business tax expenditures.
18
For budget and revenue
estimate purposes, “[t]ax expenditures are similar to direct spending
programs that function as entitlements to those who meet established
statutory criteria.”
19
The cost to taxpayers of the 2017 TCJA was substantial and initially
projected to increase federal deficits by more than $1.8 trillion from 2018–
2027.
20
More recently, the nonpartisan Congressional Joint Committee on
Taxation (“JCT”), the official congressional budget estimator for tax
expenditures, estimated that three tax expenditures targeted to small
businesses (i.e., Sections 179 and 1202) and individuals with business
income (i.e., Section 199A) will cost U.S. taxpayers more than $300.3
billion in revenue losses in the five-year period from 2019–2023.
21
17. Unified Framework, supra note 16, at 7.
18. JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE
CONFERENCEAGREEMENT FORH.R. 1, THE “TAX CUTSAND JOBSACT” (Dec. 18, 2017)
[hereinafter JCX-67-17], https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id
=5053 (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); see also JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-55-19,
ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2019-2023 2 (Dec. 18,
2019) [hereinafter JCX-55-19], https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown
&id=5238 (referring to “special income tax provisions” as “tax expenditures” because
they “may be considered alternative means of accomplishing similar budget policy
objectives”) (showing the JCT’s estimates of tax expenditures that have a greater than
de minimis (i.e., more than $50 million of revenue loss) impact on the federal budget
for use by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), as well as the congressional tax-
writing and budget committees in view of both “precedent” and “a subsequent statutory
requirement that CBO rely exclusively on JCT staff estimates when considering the
revenue effects of proposed legislation”). See generally Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit
Identity Crisis? Or Tax Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a
Collective Identity, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 707 (2005) (deconstructing the history of tax
expenditure analysis).
19. JCX-55-19, supra note 18, at 2.
20. Letter from Keith Hall, Director, Cong. Budget Office, to Senator Rob Wyden,
Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Jan. 2, 2018), https://www.cbo.gov/sys
tem/files/115th-congress-2017-2018/costestimate/53437-wydenltr.pdf (stating that the
Congressional Budget Office and Joint Committee on Taxation determined that the
deficits under the Conference Agreement over the 2018-2027 period would increase by
$1.5 trillion and the additional debt service would see a $1.8 trillion ten-year increase
in deficits).
21. JCX-55-19, supra note 18, at 24–25 (estimating the cost of the following
provisions from 2019-2023: (i) expensing under Section 179 of depreciable property
($59.9 billion); (ii) Section 199A, which is an up to 20 percent deduction for qualified
business income ($233.5 billion); and, (iii) Section 1202, which allows a 100 percent
exclusion of capital gain from tax for investments in certain small business stock ($6.9
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However, at no point prior to or during debate over the TCJA did the
congressional tax-writing committees publicly, meaningfully, and
specifically consider whether this would be money well spent when it
comes to women business owners (“WBOs”).
22
In fact, during the sole
U.S. Senate Committee on Finance (“SFC”) hearing held in 2017 to
examine proposals for business tax reform, women business owners were
not even represented at the witnesses table.
23
This is acutely problematic
because while women-owned firms have grown to number more than 40
percent of all U.S. firms as of 2019, the majority are small businesses
operating in service industries and continue to face challenges growing
their receipts and accessing capital.
24
Moreover, research released and provided to Congress in June 2017 on
WBOs and tax expenditures found that three of four of the most expensive
small business tax expenditures included in the Code (i.e., IRC § 1202, §
1244, and § 179) were so limited in design that they either (i) explicitly
excluded service firms (e.g., IRC § 1202), and by extension, the majority of
women-owned firms; or (ii) effectively bypassed women-owned firms that
are not incorporated (IRC § 1244) or that are service firms with few
capital-intensive equipment investments altogether (IRC § 179).
25
The
billion)). But see infra Part III (explaining that Congress did not amend Section 1202
in TCJA, but that parts of Section 199A are derivative from Section 1202).
22. Compare BDBS, supra note 1, at 9 (connecting the Kogod Tax Policy Center’s
research done for BDBS with their review of 1,274 full congressional tax-writing
committee hearings — from 1986 until 2016 — to confirm that neither the House of
Representatives Committee on Ways and Means (“W&M”) nor the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance (“SFC”) has ever dedicated a full-committee hearing to
assessing the impact of small business tax incentives with respect to women-owned
firms), with S. REP. NO. 116-19, at 6 (2019) (giving an example of a hearing that
included four women, out of seventeen witnesses, during 2017, but still did not hold a
full committee hearing specifically on the tax challenges of women business owners in
connection with tax reform), and H.R. REP. NO. 115-1115, at 117–18 (2019) (showing
that the W&M Subcommittee on Tax Policy held two hearings in 2017 on tax reform
soliciting testimony from eight witnesses, two of whom were women business owners).
23. See Business Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 115th Cong.
342 (2017); S. REP. NO. 116-19, at 6 (2019) (noting that the SFC held the hearing on
September 19, 2017, and invited four witnesses to testify: Scott Hodge, President, Tax
Foundation; Donald B. Marron, Institute Fellow, Urban Institute; Troy K. Lewis,
Immediate Past Chair, Tax Executive Committee, American Institute of Certified
Public Accountants; and Jeffrey D. DeBoer, President and CEO, Real Estate
Roundtable).
24. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 7; ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra note 5, at 8;
2019 AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT, supra note 12, at 3, 10–11.
25. BDBS supra note 1, at 3 (summarizing the results of the BDBS survey of the
members of Women Impacting Public Policy (“WIPP”) and its coalition partners as a
measure of (i) how often WBOs claimed small business tax expenditures; (ii) how
familiar self-identified WBOs were with Sections 1202, 1244, 179, and 195; and (iii)
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challenges that women business owners face are not new and Congress had
the opportunity to consider them in connection with the 2017 tax reform
debate.
26
It failed to do so.
This Article considers Congress’ latest efforts to spur economic growth
through the TCJA with respect to women-owned firms and concludes that
Congress effectively doubled-down on the blind spot it has with respect to
women business owners and tax expenditures targeted to small businesses.
Although millions of WBOs will have some tax savings from TCJA’s
marginal rate cuts and other provisions, this Article argues that the
legislation had unintended consequences with respect to the ability for
women-owned firms to access capital, reflecting the billion dollar blind
whether those firms used them to raise capital). The survey, which WIPP consultants
conducted from March 9, 2017 through April 11, 2017, received 515 completed
responses from women who, on their own, or with other women, owned at least 51
percent of a business, from the more than 550,000 WIPP or coalition partner members
invited to participate. See Jane Campbell, Women Business Owners Are Missing Out
On Billions in Tax Incentives & Investments: Congress Can Change That, NAT’L
ASS’N OF WOMEN IN REAL EST. BUS. (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.nawrb.com/women-
business-owners-are-missing-out-on-billions-in-tax-incentives-investments-congress-
can-change-that; WOMEN IMPACTING PUBLIC POLICY, REPORT: WOMEN BUSINESS
OWNERS MISS OUT ON KEY TAX PROVISIONS DESIGNED TO STIMULATE SMALL
BUSINESSGROWTH (2017), https://www.wipp.org/page/BlindSpot.
26. Caroline Bruckner submitted multiple statements for the record to both the SFC
and W&M committees and testified before the U.S. House Committee on Small
Business in connection with hearings organized as part of the 2017 legislative debate
on tax reform. The testimony and submissions included links to and excerpts from
BDBS, which detailed the legislative history and Congress’ intent to provide access to
capital and opportunities for growth to small businesses with respect to four specific
tax expenditures (i.e., I.R.C. § 1202; I.R.C. § 1244; I.R.C. § 179; I.R.C. § 195). See
Small Business Tax Reform: Modernizing the Code for the Nation’s Job Creators:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Small Bus., 115th Cong. 5 (2017) (testimony of
Caroline Bruckner), https://republicans-smallbusiness.house.gov/uploadedfiles/10-4-
17_bruckner_testimony.pdf; Statement for the Record in Connection with July 13
Hearing, “How Tax Reform Will Help America’s Small Businesses Grow and Create
New Jobs”, 115th Cong. 193 (2017) (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-
Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center
Kogod School of Business, American University Resident),
https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM05/20170713/106236/HHRG-115-WM05-
Transcript-20170713.pdf; Submission from Caroline Bruckner to the U.S. S. Fin.
Comm. in Response to the Chair’s Request for Recommendations for Tax Reform (on
file with author — confidential submission); Caroline Bruckner, Statement for the
Record to the U.S. Senate Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship in Connection
with the June 14 Hearing Titled, “Tax Reform & Barriers to Small Bus. Growth” (June
28, 2017) (statement of Caroline Bruckner); Caroline Bruckner, Women in Business
Must Be a Priority in U.S. Tax Reform Plans, FIN. TIMES, (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.ft.com/content/ebda758c-8cb7-11e7-a352-e46f43c5825d; Caroline
Bruckner, How the US Tax Code Bypasses Women Entrepreneurs, THE CONVERSATION
(Oct. 25, 2017, 7:39 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-the-us-tax-code-bypasses-
women-entrepreneurs-86039.
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spot Congress has when it comes to WBOs and the Code. Post-tax reform
and given the economic devastation triggered by the 2020 novel
coronavirus pandemic, there is an even greater urgency for policymakers to
engage in effective tax expenditure oversight and work with federal
agencies and congressional committees to develop the data and research
required for evidence-based policymaking.
Part II of this Article provides background on the economic contributions
of women’s business ownership and reviews how women-owned firms are
organized, their average receipts, and growth trends. In addition, Part II
summarizes the ongoing challenges these firms encounter growing their
businesses and accessing capital. Part III sets forth new data on the
underrepresentation of women as witnesses before the tax-writing
committees and its connection to the recent tax reform process. Part IV of
this Article summarizes two small business tax expenditures Congress
funded in the TCJA that reflect the unintended consequences of Congress’
billion dollar blind spot including: (1) Section 199A – Qualified Business
Income Deduction; and (2) Section 179 – Accelerated Deduction for Small
Businesses. Part V discusses recent efforts by Congress to consider how
WBOs can benefit from targeted tax policy and suggests strategies for
Congress to develop effective tax expenditure oversight and evidence-
based policymaking.
II. WOMEN BUSINESSOWNERS AS AN ECONOMIC FORCE
Since Census started tracking them in 1972, the number of women-
owned firms has increased exponentially.
27
Prior to 2017, the most
consistent measure of this increase was the Census Survey of Business
Owners (“SBO”), which Census conducted every five years, in years
ending in two or seven, with the most recent being done in 2012.
28
That
year, Census counted more than 9.9 million women-owned firms — an
27. BDBS, supra note 1, at 11. See generally ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, supra
note 5 (stating that the 1977 Census reported that 75 percent of all women-owned firms
were concentrated in the services and retail trade sectors).
28. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, SURVEY OF BUSINESS OWNERS (SBO),
https://www.census.gov/econ/overview/mu0200.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2020). In
2017, Census announced it would replace the SBO with an annualized survey called the
Annual Business Survey (“ABS”). Census Bureau Announces New 2017 Annual
Business Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (June 19, 2018), https://www.census.gov/news
room/press-releases/2018/annual-business-survey.html. Census’ decision to transition
away from the SBO to the ABS, which will only track employer firms, could mean
Census “is unable to guarantee comprehensive data sets for 90% of women-owned
small businesses.” NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNSEL, 2019 ANNUAL REPORT 28 (2019)
[hereinafter 2019 NWBC ANNUAL REPORT], https://cdn.www.nwbc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2019/12/20204228/NWBC-2019-Annual-Report-508compliant.pdf.
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increase of 26.8 percent from 2007.
29
More recent data, based on the 2012
SBO results, continues to show the skyrocketing growth of WBOs over the
last four decades.
30
In 2019, there were approximately thirteen million
(12,943,400) WBOs with revenue of almost $2 trillion.
31
When combined
with firms owned equally by men and women, women-owned firms total
15,258,900 — or “49 percent of all businesses.”
32
Notably, women of color have led the charge in the growth of women-
owned businesses.
33
Firms owned by women of color grew at a rate of 43
percent over the last five years (double the 21 percent rate of all new
women-owned firms) and “account for 50 percent of all women-owned
businesses.”
34
In 2019, women-owned firms employed 8 percent of the
private sector workforce, which translates to approximately 9.4 million
people.
35
A. Most Women-Owned Firms Are Small Business Service Firms
Despite these gains, private sector and academic research has found that
“although women business owners account for 40 percent of all U.S. firms
and the total number of women-owned firms has increased over the last ten
years by 58 percent, [they] remain small businesses primarily operating as
service firms (more than 60 percent) and continue to face challenges
growing receipts and accessing capital.”
36
Government research has found
that “almost all (99.9 [percent]) of women-owned businesses are small
businesses” and that the overwhelming majority (90 percent) of women-
29. Erika H. Becker-Medina, Women-Owned Firms on the Rise, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (July 31, 2019), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/blogs/random-samplings
/2016/03/women-owned-businesses-on-the-rise.html.
30. 2019 AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Impact on the Budget and American Families: Hearing on 2017 Tax Law
Before the H. Comm. on Budget, 116th Cong. 4 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 TAX REFORM
BUDGET HEARING] (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence,
Accounting and Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School
of Business, American University) (citing data from AMERICAN EXPRESS, The 2018
State of Women-Owned Businesses Report (2018) [hereinafter 2018 AMERICAN
EXPRESS REPORT], https://about.americanexpress.com/files/doc_library/file/2018-state-
of-women-owned-businesses-report.pdf) (noting that firms owned by women of color
grew by 163 percent from 2007 to 2018 and 64 percent of new women-businesses
launched every day are owned by women of color); id. at 4–5.
34. 2019 AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT, supra note 12, at 4–5.
35. Id. at 3.
36. 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET HEARING, supra note 33, at 47 (statement of
Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University).
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owned businesses are non-employer businesses (i.e., businesses with no
employees).
37
In terms of revenue, in 2012, 88.5 percent of women-owned
firms had annual receipts below $100,000.
38
Notwithstanding their
exponential growth, less than 2 percent of (or just 171,842) of WBOs had
annual receipts in excess of $1 million in 2012.
39
Table 1. 2012 Census SBO Data on Women-Owned Firms
40
Receipt/Revenue
Size
Number of Women-
Owned Firms
Percent of Women-
Owned Firms
Total/2012 SBO Data 9,878,397 100%
less than $5,000 2,497,048 25.3%
$5,000 to $9,999 1,776,343 18.0%
$10,000 to $24,999 2,722,295 27.6%
$25,000 to $49,999 1,052,900 10.7%
$50,000 to $99,999 681,243 6.9%
$100,000 to $249,999 553,503 5.6%
$250,000 to $499,999 258,398 2.6%
$500,000 to $999,999 164,824 1.7%
$1,000,000 or more 171,842 1.7%
This is a sharp contrast to the 6.2 percent or 923,173 male-owned firms
with receipts of $1 million or more.
41
Also troubling is a 2019 estimate
that found that while overall women-owned firms averaged $142,900 in
earnings, firms owned by women of color averaged only $65,800 in annual
revenues, while non-minority women-owned firms averaged more than
37. Michael J. McManus, Women’s Business Ownership: Data from the 2012
Survey of Business Owners, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. 2, 4 (May 31, 2017),
https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/advocacy/Womens-Business-Ownership-in-the-
US.pdf (defining a small business as having fewer than 500 employees).
38. BDBS, supra note 1, at 11 (noting that women owned businesses are mostly in
the service industry).
39. Id.; see also McManus, supra note 37, at 11 (supporting the point that women-
owned firms grew from 2007 to 2012).
40. BDBS, supra note 1, at Table 1; see id. at 12 n.39 (stating that the table is from
the “research division of National Women’s Business Council derived from Census
2012 SBO data”); see also Behind the Numbers: The State of Women–Owned
Businesses in 2018, WOMEN’S BUSINESS ENTER. NATIONAL COUNCIL (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://www.wbenc.org/blog-posts/2018/10/10/behind-the-numbers-the-state-of-women
-owned-businesses-in-2018 (stating the number of women-owned businesses which
generate less than $100,000 is 88 percent of all women-owned businesses and that only
1.7 percent of all women-owned businesses generate $1,000,000 or more in revenue).
41. BDBS, supra note 1, at 11.
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double — $218,800.
42
Despite the economic recovery since 2012, the “vast majority” of
women-owned businesses (88 percent or 10,775,600 firms) continued to
generate revenues less than $100,000 in 2018, and that “[overall] revenue
growth for women-owned business was driven by the addition of firms, not
an increase in average revenue per firm.”
43
In terms of industry representation, although women-owned firms have
permeated every industry sector to some degree, they remain
predominately active in service industries and are underrepresented in other
industries.
44
“For example, according SBA’s Office of Advocacy’s
analysis of Census’ 2012 SBO data, while women own 36 [percent] of all
U.S. firms and 20 [percent] of all employer businesses, ‘women-owned
businesses were only 9 [percent] of the construction industry and 24
[percent] of the manufacturing industry.’”
45
More recent private sector
data on WBOs has found:
  Half of women-owned businesses are concentrated in three
industries: other services (23%), health care and social assistance (15%),
and professional/scientific/technical services (12%);
  Women are significantly more likely to launch businesses within the
healthcare (10%) or education sectors (9%) than men (5% in both cases).
In contrast, men are significantly more likely to start businesses in the
construction and manufacturing industries (12%) than women (4%).
  Women-owned businesses employ the most people in healthcare and
social assistance (20%), accommodations and food services (16%) and
administrative, support and waste management services (13%).
42. See 2019 AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT, supra note 12, at 5.
43. 2018 AMERICAN EXPRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 5 (finding that women
entrepreneurship is still growing however).
44. BDBS, supra note 1, at 12; see McManus, supra note 37, at 4 (highlighting that
the top four out of five industries women own businesses in are services and that these
industries typically have a higher than average ratio of WBOs); see also 2018
AMERICAN EXPRESS REPORT, supra note 33, at 11 (determining that “other services”
firms owned by women, such as hair salons and pet care businesses, have experienced
126 percent growth from 2007 to 2018 compared to 58 percent growth for all women-
owned businesses in the same time period).
45. BDBS, supra note 1, at 12 (showing statistics of how women are
underrepresented in certain industries). See generally McManus, supra note 37
(discussing representation of women-owned business across all U.S. firms as a percent
of employer business in 2012); SCORE Association, The Megaphone of Main Street:
Women’s Entrepreneurship Spring 2018, SCORE ASS’N (2018), https://s3.amazon
aws.com/mentoring.redesign/s3fs-public/SCORE-Megaphone-of-Main-Street-Women
%E2%80%99s-Entrepreneurship-Spring-2018_1.pdf (highlighting the representation of
women-owned businesses in various industries).
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  Women-owned businesses have the highest total revenue in
wholesale trade (17%), retail trade (15%) and professional, scientific and
technical services (10%).
46
Although limited federal government data and private sector data on the
number of women-owned firms, their receipts, and presence among
industries is available, similar government research on the current number
of women-owned firms operating as C-corporations or S-corporations from
existing SBA or IRS data is not regularly collected and published.
47
Instead, IRS publishes general statistics for firm organization showing
that sole proprietors, subchapter S-corporations, and partnerships,
collectively, filed approximately 95 percent of the 33.4 million business tax
returns for the 2013 tax year; sole proprietors filed 72 percent of the
returns, followed by S-corporations (13 percent), partnerships (10 percent),
and C-corporations (5 percent).
48
That noted, IRS does have some data for
women-owned firms operating as sole proprietors, and SBA’s Office of
Advocacy does track data on the legal organization for small firms
generally.
49
In particular, IRS research division, the Statistics of Income
(“SOI”), provides data on women-owned sole proprietors and, as of 2014,
counted 11.7 million women-owned firms operating as sole proprietors (an
estimated 42.6 percent of the total 27.6 million sole proprietors) using
taxpayer data, “but does not have these data for the other forms of
businesses.”
50
46. Behind the Numbers: The State of Women-Owned Businesses in 2018, WBENC
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.wbenc.org/blog-posts/2018/10/10/behind-the-numbers-
the-state-of-women-owned-businesses-in-2018 (analyzing data from the 2018
AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT).
47. BDBS, supra note 1, at 11–12. This kind of data, if regularly collected and
made available, would provide insight to policymakers on the uptake rates and revenue
loss distribution of small business tax expenditures with respect to WBOs as described
infra Part IV.
48. GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF11122, 2019 TAX FILING SEASON
(2018 TAX YEAR): SECTION 199A DEDUCTION FOR PASSTHROUGH BUSINESS INCOME
(2019) [hereinafter CRS199A REPORT], https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/IF11122.pdf
(explaining that evidence suggests Congress intended the 199A deduction for
noncorporate businesses to be a tax cut “comparable” to the corporate tax rate cut under
TCJA).
49. See Frequently Asked Questions about Small Business, SMALL BUS. ASS’NOFF.
OF ADVOC., (Sept. 24, 2019), https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/20
19/09/24153946/Frequently-Asked-Questions-Small-Business-2019-1.pdf.
50. BDBS, supra note 1, at 12 n.46.
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B. Women-Owned Firms Still Encounter Growth and Access to
Capital Challenges
Despite the considerable gaps in government research on how women-
owned firms are organized, extensive work has been done by academics on
gender and entrepreneurship.
51
Much of it has focused on the challenges
women business owners have growing their revenue and accessing capital.
In fact, although Census research has tracked a dramatic spike in the
number of women-owned firms in recent decades, average receipts and
firm size have not grown to the same degree, indicating, among other
things, that challenges remain for these small business owners.
52
For example, in 2017, SBA’s Office of Advocacy issued a report on
women-owned firms finding that they continue to “lag behind in revenue
and employment. For every dollar of revenue an average women-owned
employer business earns, a male-owned business earns $2.30. For every
[ten] employees at a women-owned business, a male-owned business
employs [fifteen].”
53
Related to the growth challenges women-owned firms encounter is the
documented challenge women-owned firms have accessing capital.
54
51. See generally ALBERT N. LINK & DEREK R. STRONG, GENDER AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY (2016) (covering scholarly
contributions from 1979 through 2016 to gender and entrepreneurship); Patricia G.
Greene et al., Women Entrepreneurs: Moving Front and Center: An Overview of
Research and Theory (2003) (overview on research and theory on women
entrepreneurs); Jennifer Jennings & Candida Brush, Research on Women
Entrepreneurs: Challenges To (and From) the Broader Entrepreneurship Literature?,
7 ACAD. MGMT. ANNS. 663 (2013). However, this research generally does not consider
tax issues. To see what research has been done on women and tax issues specifically,
see BDBS, supra note 1, at 15 n.63 (citing Anthony C. Infanti & Bridget J. Crawford,
Critical Tax Theory: An Introduction (U. of Pitt. Legal Studies Research, Working
Paper No. 2009-04), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1333799#)
(listing a series of foundational works on women and tax issues generally and
explaining that “legal scholars beginning with Grace Blumberg and including: Anne
Alstott, Dorothy Brown, Bridget Crawford, Anthony Infanti, Carolyn C. Jones,
Marjorie Kornhauser, and Nancy Staudt to name only some, have developed research
analyzing ‘what impact the tax laws have on historically disempowered groups’”) .
52. See, e.g., Susan Coleman & Alicia Robb, Access to Capital by High-Growth
Women-Owned, NAT’L WOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL (2014), https://cdn.www.nw
bc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/27191226/High-Growth-Women-Owned-Busin
esses-Access-to-Capital-Report.pdf.
53. SeeMcManus, supra note 37, at 13.
54. See A Compendium of National Statistics on Women-Owned Businesses in the
U.S., CTR. FOR WOMEN’S BUS. RESEARCH (2001), https://cdn.www.nwbc.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/27202652/A-Compendium-of-National-Statistics-on-Women-
Owned-Businesses-in-the-U.S.pdf. See generally CANDIDA G. BRUSH ET AL., DIANA
REPORT: WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 2014: BRIDGING THE GENDER GAP IN VENTURE
CAPITAL (2014) (analyzing venture capital investments in women entrepreneurs since
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Indeed, some older research found that “lack of access to capital (including
personal resources) is seen as a major reason for the concentration of
women-owned businesses in service and retail.”
55
More recent research
has reiterated that WBOs “struggle to access capital, which in turn restricts
their growth.”
56
In 2018, the nonpartisan National Women’s Business Council (the
“NWBC”), which is a federal advisory committee that provides
independent analysis, research, and policy recommendations to the
Administration, SBA, and the congressional small business committees,
published a report on WBO’s ability to access capital and reiterated that
when it comes to financing their businesses, women-owned firms face
systemic obstacles that “impede their growth, many of which are in place
from the beginning.”
57
In general, “women start businesses with smaller
amounts of capital than men, are less likely to raise capital from external
sources, and . . . are more likely to say they do not need financing to start a
business because they are more likely than men to rely on owner-provided
equity to launch their firms.”
58
With respect to accessing bank loans, research has found that:
[S]everal characteristics of women-owned businesses . . . affect their
access to loans and set them apart from men-owned entities, including:
  WBOs are slightly less likely to have high credit scores compared to
men;
  Women-owned businesses are less likely to be incorporated;
  WBOs have fewer years of industry and startup experience;
  WBOs are less likely to apply for new loans; and
  WBOs are slightly more likely to not apply for new credit when they
need it, ostensibly because of fear of denial.
59
Those fears are not unwarranted. The data on WBOs and conventional
bank loans shows generally, and SBA loans show in particular, that WBOs
represent a minority of the total number of conventional and SBA loans for
small businesses. For example, in the fiscal year of 2019, SBA approved
more than $28.2 billion in loans of which “nearly” $6.6 billion (or 23
1999).
55. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 13.
56. NAT’LWOMEN’S BUS. COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING THE LANDSCAPE: ACCESS TO
CAPITAL FOR WOMEN ENTREPRENEURS 1 (Mar. 1, 2018) [hereinafter NWBC 2018
REPORT], https://cdn.www.nwbc.gov/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/28215658/NWBC-
Report_Understanding-the-Landscape-Access-to-Capital-for-Women-
Entrepreneurs.pdf.
57. Id. at 2.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 16.
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percent of the total) went to women-owned firms through the 7(a)
program.
60
In 2014, the U.S. Senate Committee for Small Business and
Entrepreneurship, published its own report (“Small Business Committee
Report”) on existing barriers to women’s entrepreneurship and concluded
that “in the area of capital, studies find that women do not get sufficient
access to loans and venture investment.”
61
Specifically, the Small Business
Committee Report found that access to capital is a more severe challenge
for women-owned firms when it noted:
1. Women account for only 16 percent of conventional small business
loans, and 17 percent of SBA loans even though they represent 30
percent of all small companies.
2. Of conventional small business loans, women only account for 4.4
percent of total dollar value of loans from all sources. In other words,
just $1 of every $23 in conventional small business loans goes to a
woman-owned business.
62
More recently, the NWBC cited research in its December 2019 annual
report that in 2018, female founders got less than 3 percent of the $130
billion of venture capital dollars.
63
The consequences of failing to have
reliable access to capital are well-documented in the existing literature,
“finding evidence that [WBOs] have difficulty accessing debt capital, lines
of credit, and other forms of funding.”
64
These challenges can compound
and “lead to difficulties in market access as corporate buyers of goods and
services frequently evaluate their potential suppliers’ financial ability to
determine their dependability.”
65
As alarming as these facts are, “notable gaps remain in government
research on women-owned firms and access to capital issues.”
66
In fact, the
Small Business Committee Report ultimately found that:
60. U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., SBA FINANCIAL AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT FISCAL
YEAR 2019 1 (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/2019-
12/SBA_FY_2019_AFR-508.pdf; see also NWBC 2018 REPORT supra note 56, at 5–8
(analyzing SBA’s loan data from FY 2011-2016 set forth in Tables 2, 3, 4, and 5 that
shows that in each year for the SBA’s flagship lending programs, WBOs represent less
than one-quarter of overall loan recipients by volume and participation during those
years).
61. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MAJORITY REP.
OF THE U.S. SEN. COMM. ON SMALL BUS. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP, 21ST CENTURY
BARRIERS TOWOMEN’S ENTREPRENEURSHIP 2 (2014).
62. Id.
63. 2019 NWBCANNUAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 17.
64. NWBC 2018 REPORT, supra note 56, at 11–12.
65. Id. at 13.
66. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 14.
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[W]hen it comes to assessing the capital needs of women-owned
businesses, limited government data on small business credit and
virtually none that is gender-based has hindered the development of
effective public policy to support and provide adequate access to capital.
The lack of data is as astounding as it is concerning.
67
At the same time, what limited research that is available on WBOs and
tax issues has readily acknowledged tax as an important source of equity
for small businesses:
Taxation plays a key role in the survival and growth of small businesses,
primarily through its effect on equity infusion. The major source of
equity capital for expansion of a business is reinvested profits. The
amount of tax the business must pay determines the amount of money
available for growth and expansion.
68
Notwithstanding the fact that policymakers often design tax provisions
as a means to provide access to capital to small businesses, the overall
absence of government tax data and research on women-owned firms’
ability to claim tax expenditures as a means to access capital remains a
billion dollar blind spot for policymakers and taxpayers.
69
Compounding
the overall lack of tax research on WBOs is the reality that congressional
tax-writers are significantly less likely to hear testimony from women
during hearings. As described in Part III infra, analysis of witness
testimony presented during congressional tax-writing committee hearings
reveals that women are regularly underrepresented as witnesses before
these committees.
III. DATA ONWOMEN TESTIFYING BEFORE THE TAX-WRITING
COMMITTEES
In announcing the decision to move forward with tax reform in April
2017, then-Chair of W&M, Rep. Kevin Brady (R-TX), announced that
W&M would hold a series of hearings on tax reform in Spring 2017 with a
plan to vote on legislation later in the Summer.
70
This announcement
67. BDBS, supra note 1, at 14 (citing STAFF OF S. COMM. ON SMALL BUS. AND
ENTREPRENEURSHIP, supra note 61).
68. BDBS, supra note 1, at 5.
69. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 4; see also Ariel Jurow Kleiman et al., The Faulty
Foundatons of the Tax Code: Gender and Racial Bias in Our Tax Laws, NATIONAL
WOMEN’S LAW CENTER (2019), https://nwlc-ciw49tixgw5lbab.stackpathdns.com/wp-
content/uploads/2019/11/NWLC-The-Faulty-Foundations-of-the-Tax-Code-
Accessible-FINAL.pdf (acknowledging the absence of data on tax expenditure
distribution among women, people of color, and other marginalized communities
generally and recommending, inter alia, applying inclusive budgeting principles to the
entirety of the tax system).
70. REUTERS, U.S. House Tax Committee Plans Public Hearings on Tax Overhaul,
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followed a years-long effort to overhaul the Code and hold a series of
hearings, which, in prior congresses at least, had been a bipartisan effort.
71
Congressional committees organize hearings in one of four types:
legislative, oversight, investigative, or nomination as a primary means of
soliciting expert testimony, insight, and advice for legislative and oversight
functions.
72
In 1986, which was the last time Congress successfully passed
comprehensive tax reform, the tax-writing committees adopted an
aggressive outreach strategy over the preceding two years that included
hearings and testimony from businesses, individuals, experts, and other
stakeholders, resulting in eighty-nine hearings with nearly 2,600 witnesses,
according to one analysis.
73
During that time, JCT prepared sixty-two
reports over twenty-one months; CBO and CRS wrote an additional ten,
with one specifically dedicated to considering the racial implications of
provisions of the 1986 tax reform effort.
74
In contrast, the tax reform hearing process during the 115th Congress
was much more condensed. As summarized in Table 2 below, the
congressional tax-writing committees held a total of twelve hearings on tax
reform in 2017 alone, and less than 19 percent of the witnesses testifying at
these hearings were women.
75
Of the twelve tax reform hearings, women
CNBC (Apr. 6, 2017, 6:06 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/06/us-house-tax-
committee-plans-public-hearings-on-tax-overhaul.html.
71. Max Baucus & Dave Camp, Tax Reform Is Very Much Alive and Doable,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 7, 2013, 6:23 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000142412788
7323611604578396790773598474.
72. VALERIE HEITSHUSEN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL98-317, TYPES OF
COMMITTEE HEARINGS (2018), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/cb39da50-6535-
4824-9d2f-e5f1fcf0a3e4.pdf.
73. Peter Carey et al., The Trump Tax Law Has Big Problems. Here’s One Big
Reason Why, CENT’R FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Jan. 15, 2019), https://publicintegrity.org
/inequality-poverty-opportunity/taxes/trumps-tax-cuts/trump-tax-law-has-big-problems.
74. Id.
75. Data for Tables 2, 3 & 4 extrapolated from the Congressional Record
Representation Dataset [hereinafter CRRD] (dataset on file with author). The CRRD is
the first-of-its kind digital diversity and inclusion legislative tool in the U.S. designed
to track the number of women and people of color testifying before congressional
committees to measure diversity and inclusion of congressional witnesses. Developed
in 2019, the CRRD is comprised of witnesses testifying at congressional legislative,
oversight or investigative hearing identified using published committee end-of-
congress (EOC) reports and hearing transcripts. The CRRD excludes witnesses at
confirmation hearings or mark-ups. The CRRD has been created by human-based
processing of publicly available EOC Reports, which congressional committees are
required to prepare and file at the end of each Congress. EOC Reports document a
committee’s legislative activities during a Congress and identify witnesses that testified
at hearings. Preliminary results for the gender of witnesses before SFC and W&M
from the CRRD for the 110th–112th Congresses announced in January 2020 at the 20th
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participated as witnesses in only seven, and as noted supra, no women
business owners testified at the sole SFC hearing on business tax reform in
2017. Notably, no women testified at five (42 percent) of the twelve total
tax reform hearings the tax-writing committees held on tax reform in
2017.
76
Table 2. 115th Congress Tax Reform Hearing Witness Totals
Totals SFC W&M
Tax Reform Hearings 5 7
Hearings without any Women 2 3
Witnesses 17 48
Men 13 40
Women 4 (24%) 8 (17%)
To be fair, the absence of women’s testimony before the tax-writing
committees during the tax reform debate in the 115th Congress is not
unusual when considered in the larger context of women testifying before
the tax-writing committees in recent congresses on tax reform and the
failure of the tax-writing committee to hold hearings focused on women
business owners.
In fact, research published in June 2017 — and made available to the
tax-writing committees — found that of the 1,274 full-committee hearings
over 1,521 days of each of the congressional tax-writing committees for the
99th to the 114th Congresses (1985–2016), neither committee had held any
Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association in San Juan, Puerto,
Rico. CAROLINE BRUCKNER, KAREN O’CONNOR & DAKOTA STRODE, A SEAT AT THE
TABLE: JUST HOW REPRESENTATIVE IS THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS? AN ANALYSIS OF
THEGENDERDISTRIBUTION OFWITNESSES BEFORE A SELECT GROUP OF COMMITTEES IN
THE U.S. CONGRESS (2020) [hereinafter CRRD PRELIMINARY FINDINGS PAPER],
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3543554.
76. For purposes of determining how many tax reform hearings the congressional
tax-writing committees held during the 110th–115th Congresses, the author initially
reviewed the tax-writing committees EOC reports for the 110th–115th Congresses and
identified each legislative, oversight, and investigative hearing that included the terms
“reform” or “tax reform” in the hearing’s title or the executive summary. The search
criteria then expanded to include legislative hearings that contemplated major changes
to the tax code indicative of reform as described in the summary of the hearing
included in the EOC reports. Preliminary totals were compared to the general tax
reform hearing lists developed and maintained by Professor Annette Nellen at San Jose
State University, available at https://www.sjsu.edu/people/annette.nellen/website/115th
-hearings.htm#General (last visited on Apr. 19, 2020). The final hearing totals were
adjusted to include tax-writing committee general tax reform hearings listed on
Professor Nellen’s site in the general tax reform hearing category notwithstanding the
absence of the word “reform” in the hearing title.
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full committee hearings dedicated to assessing the impact of tax incentives
designed to create access to capital with respect to women-owned firms,
despite the fact that women business owners had grown from little more
than 3 million to more than 11.3 million, or 38 percent, of all U.S.
businesses during the same period.
77
A more extensive analysis of witness
testimony at tax reform hearings held by the tax-writing committees during
the 110th through the 115th Congresses from publicly-available committee
reports and transcripts shows that women did not regularly participate as
witnesses even before the 115th Congress.
78
For example, 44 percent of
the SFC tax reform hearings had no women as witnesses, while 46 percent
of W&M tax reform hearings failed to include any women. Overall,
women comprised merely 17.5 percent of the total 462 witnesses called to
testify at the 91 tax reform hearings the tax-writing committees held from
2007 through 2017.
Table 3. 110th–115th Congress Tax Reform Hearing Witness Totals
Totals SFC W&M
Total Tax Reform Hearings 50 41
Hearings without any Women 22 (44%) 19 (46%)
Witnesses 206 256
Men 168 (82%) 213 (83%)
Women 38 (18%) 43 (17%)
Admittedly, the foregoing data does not include any tax reform hearings
held by other committees during the same period that may have specifically
focused on women business owners and tax reform. Nor does it reflect the
number of women of color who may have testified, which is not currently
available, but is particularly relevant given that women of color are 50
percent of all women-owned firms as noted in Part II infra.
In addition, the data included in Table 3 counts twenty fewer SFC tax
reform hearings than the total number that the then-SFC Chair Orrin Hatch
(R-UT) counted in a press release issued in November 2017 stating SFC
tax reform efforts “over the last six years” included holding “70 hearings
on how the tax code can be improved and streamlined to work better for all
Americans.”
79
However, the witness data of all legislative hearings (i.e.,
77. BDBS, supra note 1, at 8.
78. CRRD, supra note 75.
79. Press Release, Senate Finance Committee, Senate Finance Committee Takes on
Tax Reform (Nov. 2017) [hereinafter Senate Finance Committee Takes on Tax
Reform], https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/11.9.17%20Committee%20
History.pdf. The difference in the SFC tax reform hearing totals is attributable to the
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all legislative, oversight or investigative hearings, excluding confirmation
hearings or mark-ups) held by the tax-writing committees from the 110
th
(2007-2008) through the 115th (2017-2018) Congresses shows that the
underrepresentation of women as witnesses is not confined to tax reform
hearings. Rather, the data shows that women are consistently
underrepresented at legislative hearings. For example, of the 355
legislative hearings the SFC held from the 110th through the 115th
Congress, 47 percent (166) did not include any women witnesses. W&M
was comparable: it held more total hearings (479), but it also did not have
women testify at 166 (35 percent). This systemic inequity is particularly
problematic given SFC alone “has the largest committee jurisdiction in
either chamber of Congress, oversees more than 50 percent of the federal
budget and has jurisdiction over tax, trade and healthcare policy.”
80
Table 4. 110th–115th Total SFC and W&M Legislative Hearings
Totals SFC W&M
Total Legislative Hearings 355 479
Total Hearings Without Women 166 (47%) 166 (35%)
Total Witnesses 1307 2320
Men 986 1719
Women 321 (24.56%) 601 (25.9%)
A preliminary 2020 study of the representation of women as witnesses
before the tax-writing committees during the 110th–112th Congress
concedes “that the low rates of women testifying could reflect other
inequalities in the political system such as a lower percentage of women as
committees members, as well as the fact that many senior executive
Federal agency positions are held by men.”
81
In addition, that study noted
that “the overall percentage of women as witnesses testifying before these
House and Senate committees essentially mirrors the percentage of women
in Congress — both in the low 20 percentages, yet it is actually higher than
percentage of women serving as members of these committees.”
82
However, the overall consistent underrepresentation of women as witnesses
in congressional tax-writing committee hearings remains surprising
more limited criteria used for purposes of this article described supra note 76. The
SFC EOC report for the 115th Congress did not include a tax reform hearing list
beyond the hearings SFC held during the 115th Congress. See generally S. Rep. No.
116–19 (2019).
80. Senate Finance Committee Takes on Tax Reform, supra note 79.
81. CRRD PRELIMINARY FINDINGS PAPER, supra note 75, at 16.
82. Id.
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considering that over the last forty years, WBOs have grown to number
more than 42 percent of all U.S. businesses, which would suggest a greater
presence of qualified women available to testify on business and tax issues
generally.
The impact of the absence of WBOs being fully represented as witnesses
during the tax-writing committees’ tax reform hearings is no less than a
doubling down on an existing billion dollar blind spot Congress has when it
comes to WBOs and small business tax expenditures.
IV. TCJA & SMALL BUSINESS TAX EXPENDITURES
The consequences of the absence of WBOs participating in the tax
reform legislative process is reflected by two tax expenditures funded in the
TCJA, Sections 199A and 179, which JCT now estimates will cost
taxpayers almost $300 billion in lost revenue from 2019–2023.
83
A. Section 199A – Qualified Business Income Deduction
Once it decided to cut the top corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 21
percent, Congress included a new deduction in the TCJA for individuals
with business income, Section 199A, to “provide tax relief for small
businesses that do not operate as C-corporations.”
84
In connection with its
initial summary of the cost of the TCJA, JCT estimated that Section 199A
alone would cost taxpayers more than $415 billion over ten years.
85
Notwithstanding the fact that JCT estimated the corporate tax rate cut cost
taxpayers more than three times Section 199A (i.e., approximately $1.3
trillion in fiscal years 2017–2027), according to the legislative history,
83. See JCX-55-19, supra note 18, at Table 1 (estimating the cost of the following
provisions from 2019-2023: (i) expensing under Section 179 of depreciable property
($59.9 billion); and (ii) Section 199A, which is a 20 percent deduction for qualified
business income ($233.5 billion)); see also 2019 TAX REFORMBUDGETHEARING, supra
note 33, at 4 (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and
Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business,
American University) (analyzing JCT’s analysis that more than 90 percent of the
revenue loss generated from the new deduction will flow to firms with income of over
$100,000); Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Through the Tax Code:
Hearing of the S. Comm. on Small Bus. & Entrepreneurship, 115th Cong. 4 (2018)
[hereinafter Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Hearing] (statement of
Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University)
(noting that tax investments of the TCJA were not robustly investigated with respect to
WBOs in connection with Congress’ efforts on tax reform).
84. Judith Folse Witteman, Sec. 199A: Regulations Shed Light on QBI Deduction,
J. ACCOUNTANCY (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2019
/feb/irs-sec-199a-qbi-deduction.html.
85. JCX-67-17 supra note 18, at 1.
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Section 199A “reflects Congress’s belief that a reduction in the corporate
income tax rate does not completely address the Federal income tax burden
on businesses.”
86
While Congress may have reasoned that a new deduction
for business income would benefit small businesses not otherwise able to
take advantage of a 21 percent corporate tax rate, Section 199A’s
complexity has proven to be challenging even for experienced tax
professionals and planners.
87
In fact, one commentator went so far as to
note:
[S]ection 199A’s twenty-percent deduction is far more restrictive than
the simple reduction in the C corporation tax bracket to a flat twenty-one
percent rate . . . [and] is a needlessly complex labyrinth filled with
ambiguous language that opens the unwary taxpayer to possible missteps
and an easier to meet accuracy-related penalty for substantial
understatement of tax liability.
88
In general, Section 199A is a deduction “of up to 20 [percent] of income
from a domestic business operated as a sole proprietorship or through a
partnership, S-corporation (as defined in section 1361(a)(1)), trust, or
estate.”
89
The deduction amount is “generally equal to the lesser of 20 [percent] of
combined qualified business income (QBI) . . . or 20 [percent] of taxable
income less net capital gain.”
90
For purposes of Section 199A, QBI is “for
any tax year, the net amount of qualified items of income gain, deduction,
and loss with respect to any qualified trade or business of the taxpayer.”
91
In 2019, the full deduction was available to married taxpayers filing joint
returns (“MFJ”) with taxable income below $321,400 and for taxpayers
filing as single or head-of-household with taxable income below
$160,700.
92
For taxpayers with incomes above those amounts but below
$421,400 in the case of MFJ, or $210,700 in the case of single or head of
86. JOINTCOMM. ON TAXATION, JCS-1-18, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF PUBLIC LAW
115-97, 20 (Dec. 2018), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=
5152; see also CRS199A REPORT, supra note 48.
87. See Craig Benson, Section 199A: A Magic Dance Through the Labyrinth, 58
WASHBURN L.J. 187, 214 (2019) (“The method and speed at which the TCJA became
law resulted in cryptic statutory language with little legislative history, leaving the tax
community in desperate need of guidance.”).
88. Id. at 187 (emphasis added).
89. Qualified Business Income Deduction, 84 Fed. Reg. 27, 2952 (Feb. 8, 2019)
[hereinafter QBI DEDUCTION REGULATIONS], https://www.federalregister.gov/docu
ments/2019/02/08/2019-01025/qualified-business-income-deduction.
90. Witteman, supra note 84.
91. Id.
92. See id.
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household filings, certain limitations apply to phase-out the deduction.
93
Notwithstanding these and other limitations, the IRS estimates that at least
ten million taxpayers will benefit from the new Section 199A deduction
and that the time it takes to calculate the deduction will range from “[thirty]
minutes to [twenty] hours, depending on individual circumstances, with an
estimated average of 2.5 hours.”
94
Importantly for WBOs, the majority of whom operate service
businesses,
95
if a taxpayer is (i) a “specified service trade or business”
(SSTB); and (ii) has taxable income above the Section 199A income and
phase-out thresholds, the deduction is unavailable altogether.
96
Specifically, Section 199A(d)(1) provides that a “qualified trade or
business” is any trade or business other than a SSTB, or the trade or
business of performing services as an employee.
97
The text of Section
199A(d)(2)(A) defines a SSTB to mean “any trade or business, which is
described in section 1202(e)(3)(A) (applied without regard to the words,
engineering, architecture).”
98
In effort to aid taxpayers navigating Section
199A, the IRS summarizes the relevant language from Section
1202(e)(3)(A) on its website and explains that a SSTB is:
[A] trade or business involving the performance of services in the fields
of health, law, accounting, actuarial science, performing arts, consulting,
athletics, financial services, investing and investment management,
trading, dealing in certain assets or any trade or business where the
principal asset is the reputation or skill of one or more of its employees
or owners.
99
In February 2019, IRS and Treasury issued final regulations explaining
the calculation for the Section 199A deduction, which included guidance
on what businesses qualify as SSTBs.
100
For purposes of Section 199A, a
trade or business where the principal asset is the reputation or skill of one
of its employees is limited to businesses “that receive income for endorsing
93. I.R.C. § 199A(e)(2) (showing that the thresholds and phase-out amounts for
married, filing separate taxpayers for 2019 were: $160,725 to $210,725; for tax years
beginning after 2018, the threshold and phase-out amounts are indexed to inflation).
94. QBI DEDUCTIONREGULATIONS, supra note 89, at 2952.
95. See supra Part II(A) (discussing that most women owned firms are small
business firms).
96. See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(1) (West 2019).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
98. See id. §199A(d)(2)(A).
99. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Provision 11011 Section 199A – Qualified Business
Income Deduction FAQs, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-
provision-11011-section-199a-qualified-business-income-deduction-faqs (last updated
Jan. 10, 2020).
100. See QBI DEDUCTIONREGULATIONS, supra note 89, at 2969.
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products or services; license or receive income for the use of an
individual’s image, likeness, name, signature, voice, trademark or any other
symbols associated with the individual’s identity; or receive appearance
fees or income.”
101
The regulations mirror Congress’ decision to specifically incorporate
language from an existing Code provision, Section 1202(e)(3)(A), which is
a small business tax expenditure designed to provide access to capital to
certain small businesses through the Code.
102
However, existing tax
research made available to Congress in June 2017 found that Section 1202
is a direct reflection of the billion dollar blind spot Congress has when it
comes to WBOs and small business tax expenditures.
103
Specifically, the
legislative history and absence of research on Section 1202’s effectiveness
indicates a dubious-at-best track-record, and more importantly, that it
excludes the majority of service firms, and by extension, the majority of
WBOs.
104
Specifically, when Congress developed Section 1202 in 1993, the intent
was generally understood to “encourage the flow of capital to small
businesses, many of which have difficulty attracting equity financing”
105
and to “promote long-term investments in small businesses and venture
capital startups by providing a partial exclusion of gain on the sale
qualified small business stock.”
106
In particular, Congress designed Section
1202’s partial capital gain exclusion to:
101. Witteman, supra note 84.
102. BDBS, supra note 1, at 14–15 (explaining the legislative history of Section
1202 and Congress’ intent to provide access to capital for eligible small businesses).
103. See 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET HEARING, supra note 33, at 47–48 (statement
of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University)
(showing that congressional limitation of certain service firms from eligibility
explicitly excludes a majority of women-owned firms); Expanding Opportunities for
Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 83, at 29, 34 (statement of Caroline Bruckner,
Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax
Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University) (citing survey research
that found only three WBOs had used IRC § 1202 to raise capital).
104. BDBS, supra note 1, at 3, 17 (confirming this finding to a certain degree: of
515 WBO respondents, only three (or less than .6%) indicated they had been able to
attract capital for their corporation from non-corporate investors using Section 1202;
notably, the IRS does not publish or track data on Section 1202 and women-owned
firms); see Alan D. Viard, The Misdirected Tax Debate and the Small Business Stock
Exclusion, 134 TAX NOTES 737 (2012) (noting the debate on whether this tax
expenditure levels the playing field).
105. H.R. REP. NO. 103-111, at 600.
106. BDBS, supra note 1, at 16 (citing Beckett G. Cantley, The New Section 1202
Tax-Free Business Sale: Congress Rewards Small Businesses that Survived the Great
Recession, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FINANCIAL LAW 1 (2012)).
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[F]acilitate the formation and growth of small C-corporations involved in
commercial development of new technologies by increasing their access
to relatively patient capital . . . by giving investors (individuals such as
angel investors as well as venture capital funds organized as
partnerships) an incentive to acquire significant equity stakes in such
firms.
107
Although originally intended to help small research-intensive
manufacturing firms, the legislative history of Section 1202 indicates that
Congress subsequently amended Section 1202, and ultimately eliminated
tax on gains from these investments altogether in 2010, to “encourage new
and additional investment in small businesses” in the hopes that “access to
additional capital will help the small businesses expand and create jobs.”
108
Nevertheless, since 1993, government and academic research has found
that “there is no conclusive evidence that the provision has had the
intended effect of increasing the flow of equity capital to eligible firms.”
109
In addition, tax experts have criticized it “as ineffective due to its many
limitations, including its application to selected industries.”
110
Moreover,
once Congress reduced the top capital gains rate to 15 percent in 2003, “tax
advisers saw little reason to pursue a provision that came with a host of
requirements yet yielded a tax rate benefit of less than 1 [percent].”
111
Section 1202 has gone largely unused since its enactment
112
; however,
congressional tax expenditure estimators still anticipate that it will cost
taxpayers at least $6.9 billion in lost revenue from 2019–2023.
113
Notwithstanding the lack of IRS data on the effectiveness of Section
1202 and research that indicates it excludes the majority of women-owned
firms,
114
Congress incorporated Section 1202’s provisions with respect to
107. Id. at 15; see also Cantley, supra note 106, at 5 (stating that Section 1202 was
created to promote long-term investment in small businesses).
108. BDBS, supra note 1, at 15.
109. Id. (citing CONG. RESEARCH SERV, Tax Expenditures: Compendium of
Background Material on Individual Provisions (Dec. 2016), https://www.gov
info.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-114SPRT24030/pdf/CPRT-114SPRT24030.pdf).
110. See, e.g., Viard, supra note 104, at 737 (“[T]argeting particular sectors for tax
relief tilts the economic playing field and misallocates economic resources, unless the
targeted sector is initially taxed more heavily than others, in which case the targeting
actually helps level the playing field.”).
111. Tony Nitti, Qualified Small Business Stock Gets More Attractive, THE TAX
ADVISOR (Nov. 1, 2018), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2018/nov/qualified-
small-business-stock-more-attractive.html (explaining that Section 1202 has become
more obsolete with each reduction in the long-term capital gains rate).
112. See id.
113. JCX-55-19, supra note 18, at Table 1.
114. See 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET HEARING, supra note 33, at 5–6 (statement of
Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
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service firms into the operational rules of Section 199A for purposes of
defining SSTBs.
115
Notably, Section 199A does not eliminate the
deduction for qualified business income of SSTBs until a taxpayer has
taxable income above the threshold and phase-out amounts. Most WBOs
will be able to claim some portion of the Section 199A deduction as the
overwhelming majority of WBOs have revenues below $100,000 (almost
90 percent).
116
At the same time, at least half of WBOs are concentrated in
three industries: other services, health care and social assistance, and
professional/scientific/technical services
117
that would render them
ineligible for any Section 199A deduction in the event they have revenues
over the threshold and phase-out amounts.
In addition, JCT estimates on the distribution of the overall revenue loss
of Section 199A suggest that the provision is, in fact, less favorable to
WBOs.
118
For example, according to Table 3 of JCT’s distributional
analysis of the TCJA, more than 90 percent of the revenue loss generated
from the new deduction under IRC § 199A will flow to firms with income
of more than $100,000 in 2018 and 2024.
119
This inequitable distribution is
even more pronounced when considered at higher income levels: only 1.7
percent of women-business owners have receipts of $1,000,000 or more,
120
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University)
(noting that Section 1202 is so limited that women-owned firms are effectively
excluded); see also Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Hearing, supra note
83, at 5 (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and
Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business,
American University) (explaining that there is no publicly-available data to show the
limited utility of Section 1202).
115. See I.R.C. § 199A(d)(2) (2018).
116. See supra Part II.A and Table 1.
117. 2019 AMERICAN EXPRESSREPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
118. See Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 83, at 7
(statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation
Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American
University) (explaining that JCT’s distributional analysis of the revenue loss of Section
199A suggests that the tax benefits of Section 199A will not be felt by the majority of
women business owners); 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET HEARING, supra note 33, at 6
(statement of Caroline Bruckner Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation
Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American
University) (finding that JCT’s analysis supports a finding that key tax investments are
less favorable to women); see also, Ari Glogower, The Rhetoric and Reality of Small
Business Preferences in the 2017 Tax Legislation, 16 THE FORUM 441, 448 (Nov. 30,
2018), https://doi.org/10.1515/for-2018-0030 (reviewing JCT distributional analysis
with respect to Section 199A).
119. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, JCX-32R-18, TABLES RELATED TO THE
FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2026 4 (2018), [hereinafter JCX-
32R-18], https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=5093.
120. See supra Part II.A and Table 1.
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but JCT found in 2018 that 44 percent of the IRC § 199A will flow to pass-
through businesses with $1,000,000 of income.
121
Further, JCT projects
that the 44 percent will increase to 52 percent by 2024.
122
The estimates show that the majority of the revenue Congress spent in
Section 199A flows to firms other than the majority of WBOs, which are
more than forty percent of all U.S. firms. To determine whether this is an
intended investment by Congress, the tax-writing committees should
conduct oversight on the design and distribution of Section 199A with
respect to WBOs as the JCT estimates suggest that Congress doubled-down
on its billion dollar blind spot when it comes to women-owned firms and
tax expenditures.
123
While most WBOs will no doubt see some limited benefit from IRC §
199A, JCT’s distributional analysis raises serious questions as to whether
the provision as designed adequately reflects congressional intent with
respect to women-owned firms, 99 percent of which are small
businesses.
124
As discussed supra, Congress intended Section IRC § 199A
to operate as a tax cut for small businesses comparable to the TCJA’s
121. JCX-32R-18, supra note 119, at Table 3; see also 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET
HEARING, supra note 33, at 6 (statement of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence,
Accounting and Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School
of Business, American University) (stating that only a small percentage of women
business owners will see a benefit from Section 199A); Expanding Opportunities for
Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 83, at 7 (statement of Caroline Bruckner,
Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing Director, Kogod Tax
Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University) (showing that the
majority of women business owners will not benefit from Section 199A).
122. See JCX-32R-18, supra note 119, at Table 3.
123. On April 24, 2018, SFC held a hearing titled, “Early Impressions of the New
Tax Law.” The author submitted a statement for the record explaining how the
estimates set forth in JCX-32R-18 suggest Congress’ investments in Section 199A and
Section 179 would be less favorable to WBOs. See generally Early Impressions of the
New Tax Law: Hearing Before the S. Fin. Comm., 115th Cong. (2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115shrg38066/html/CHRG-115shrg380
66.htm (statement by Caroline Bruckner). In addition, on May 23, 2018, the W&M
subcommittee on tax policy held a hearing titled, Hearing on Tax Reform and Small
Businesses: Growing Our Economy and Creating Jobs, to consider the impact of tax
reform on small businesses. On May 22, 2018, at the request of W&M staff, the author
prepared a statement for the record explaining JCT’s distributional analysis of the
revenue loss of Section 199A as set forth in JCX-32R-18 and suggested that the TCJA
tax benefits of Section 199A and Section 179 would not be felt by the majority of
women business owners (emails on file with author). During the hearing, W&M
Member, Rep. Linda Sanchez (D-CA), entered the author’s statement and supporting
report into the record. Hearing on Tax Reform and Small Businesses: Growing Our
Economy and Creating Jobs: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Tax Policy, 115th
Cong. (2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/WM/WM05/20180523/108364/HHRG-
115-WM05-Transcript-20180523.pdf.
124. See supra Part II.A.
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generous corporate tax rate cut. However, JCT’s revenue loss distribution
suggests that the overwhelming majority (more than 90 percent) of the
money spent for this single tax provision will flow to firms other than the
majority of WBOs who have revenues below $100,000.
Similarly, research suggests additional oversight is warranted with
respect to the TCJA’s investments into expanding IRC § 179 as it too will
be of limited benefit to WBOs.
B. Section 179 – Accelerated Depreciation for Investments in Tangible
Property for Small Businesses
In addition to the $414.5 billion Congress initially spent on Section
199A, Congress also invested an additional $25.9 billion enhancing Section
179, an existing small business tax expenditure, as part of TCJA.
125
Section 179 is a popular tax expenditure that has resided in the Code since
1958 and it allows businesses to deduct up to a specified amount of the cost
of qualified assets (mostly machinery and equipment) in the year the assets
are placed in service.
126
The Section 179 deduction includes two notable
limitations: (1) the deduction cannot exceed a taxpayer’s income from
their trade or business; and (2) the deduction is phased out dollar for dollar
when a taxpayer’s total spending on qualified assets exceeds a specific
threshold amount.
127
In 2017, prior to the TCJA, Section 179’s maximum deduction was
$510,000 of qualified property placed in service that year and the phase-out
threshold was $2,030,000.
128
If a “business’ total investment in qualified
property was greater than the phase-out threshold, the maximum expensing
allowance was phased out dollar for dollar, with the business no longer
eligible for Section 179 expensing when its investment in qualified
property for the year reached $2,540,000 or more.”
129
In connection with announcing their goals for 2017 tax reform
legislation, policymakers indicated a desire to “enhance unprecedented
125. JCX-67-17, supra note 18, at 3.
126. See BDBS, supra note 1, at 18. At the time Congress enacted Section 179, it
intended to “reduce the tax burden on small firms, give them an incentive to invest
more, and simplify their accounting.” Id. at 19. Since 1958, Congress has enhanced
Section 179 regularly, by “raising the expensing allowance and increasing the phase-
out threshold to ‘boost the economy and lower the tax burden on small business owners
at the same time.’” Id.
127. See I.R.C. § 179(b)(3) (2018).
128. Alice E. Keane, Immediate Expensing: How TCJA Made Depreciation
Unnecessary for the Next Five Years, 129 J. TAX’N 21, 24 (2018) (discussing changes
in expense allowances in Section 179).
129. Id.
2020 DOUBLINGDOWN ON A BILLIONDOLLAR BLIND SPOT 29
expensing for business investments, especially to provide relief for small
businesses.”
130
To make good on this promise, Congress increased the
maximum expensing deduction to $1 million and the corresponding phase-
out threshold to $2.5 million starting in tax years beginning after 2017.
131
Effectively, beginning in 2018, “businesses can depreciate up to $1 million
of the basis of qualified property placed in service in the tax year, as long
as their total investment is $2.5 million or less, after which any investment
over that amount is phased out dollar for dollar up to $3.5 million.”
132
In 2016, Treasury issued a report (the “2016 Treasury Report”)
measuring the uptake of Section 179 among firms using IRS data from
2002–2014.
133
The report found that the “take-up rates were relatively high
for Section 179 expensing . . . generally in the 70 [percent] or 80 [percent]
range for C-corporations and S-Corporations, and somewhat lower at
around 60 [percent] to 70 [percent] for partnerships and individuals.”
134
However, the 2016 Treasury Report failed to offer any insight whatsoever
as to the uptake by women-owned firms.
135
This data analysis gap is
relevant because other small business research suggests, “that accelerated
depreciation allowances are not necessarily universally good for small
businesses.”
136
Notably, in 2017 during the tax reform debate, research and WBO
survey data on Section 179 indicated that a majority of the WBOs surveyed
do not “fully benefit from Section 179 either because they don’t know
about it or don’t regularly make use of it.”
137
Post-tax reform, JCT
130. Unified Framework, supra note 16, at 7.
131. Keane, supra note 128.
132. Id.
133. See John Kitchen & Matthew Knittel, Business Use of Section 179 Expensing
and Bonus Depreciation, 2002-2014, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS 1 (2016) [hereinafter
2016 TREASURY REPORT], https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/tax-
analysis/Documents/WP-110.pdf; see also BDBS, supra note 1, at 18–19 (comparing
the Treasury report with the results of the BDBS survey); Expensing More Popular
Than Bonus Depreciation, Treasury Study Shows, FRAZIER & DEETER (Dec. 28, 2016),
https://www.frazierdeeter.com/insights/expensing-more-popular-than-bonus-dep
reciation-treasury-study-shows/ (breaking down the Treasury’s study of Section 179).
134. 2016 TREASURYREPORT, supra note 133, at 1.
135. BDBS, supra note 1, at 19.
136. See, e.g., BDBS, supra note 1, at 19; (citing Don Bruce, John Deskins & Tami
Gurley-Calvez, Depreciation Rules and Small Business Longevity, 3 J.
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & PUB. POL’Y 10, 26 (2014)). But see Kyle Pomerleau, Full
Expensing Spurs More Investment than a Corporate Rate, TAX FOUNDATION (May 3,
2017), https://taxfoundation.org/full-expensing-corporate-rate-investment (arguing that
full expensing may be preferable to tax cuts for larger firms).
137. BDBS supra note 1, at 20; Campbell, supra note 25; see also Anne Bauer, We
Can Do It? How the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Perpetuates Implicit Gender Bias in the
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estimates Section 179 is one of the most expensive tax expenditures
targeted to help small businesses and will cost taxpayers almost $60 billion
from 2019–2023 in lost revenue.
138
At the same time, there is no official
government data on the uptake rates of Section 179 by women-owned firms
— 99.9 percent of whom are small businesses.
139
Congress’ additional
$25.6 billion investment in Section 179 — absent any review or
consideration as to whether it would benefit WBOs as a means of accessing
capital — reflects the doubling down on a billion dollar blind spot
policymakers have with respect to how the Code’s small business tax
expenditures impact these thirteen million small businesses.
V. CONGRESSIONALACTION POST-TCJA
Although congressional tax writers did not specifically consider or
address the access to capital challenges WBOs have during the 2017
development of and debate over TCJA, since then, SFC Ranking Member,
Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR), has worked to remedy this oversight. Beginning
in Spring 2019, Sen. Wyden’s SFC staff repeatedly solicited input and
policy recommendations from WBO experts and stakeholders on how the
Code could address WBO access to capital challenges.
140
On Oct. 30, 2019, Sen. Wyden introduced the Providing Real
Opportunities for Growth to Rising Entrepreneurs for Sustained Success
(Progress) Act (S. 2738).
141
In connection with the bill’s introduction,
Wyden announced his intention to specifically address the challenges
WBOs have stating, “[w]omen business owners, particularly women of
color, are underestimated, underrepresented and undercapitalized . . .
[e]xisting tax incentives do not do nearly enough to help women-owned
small businesses. Our bill would diminish these gaps and help women-
owned businesses hire and grow.” The bill includes two new tax incentives
targeted to WBOs, the overwhelming majority of which have revenues
below $100,000, including:
Code, 43 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1 (2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3353324.
138. JCX-55-19, supra note 18, at 24.
139. BDBS, supra note 1, at 11, 19, 27 (referring to lack of government data on
women owned firms utilizing Section 179 and Treasury’s definition of a “small
business” that is discussed in more detail in footnote 34 of the article); see McManus,
supra note 37.
140. Press Release, Senator Wyden, Wyden Introduces Bill to Boost Capital Access
for Women-Owned Business (Oct. 30, 2019), https://www.finance.senate.gov/ranking-
members-news/wyden-introduces-bill-to-boost-capital-access-for-women-owned-
business. Author repeatedly met with SFC staff on developing legislation to help
WBOs (notes on file with author).
141. Id.
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1. A new first employee credit equal to 25 percent of W-2 wages
reported would be claimed annually, up to $10,000 in a single tax year,
with a lifetime limit of $40,000 against the business’ payroll tax liability.
Eligible businesses must be majority owned by U.S. individual(s) that
each earn $100,000 or less per year ($200,000 in the case of joint filers);
and
2. A new investment credit to encourage third-party capital investment
of up to 50 percent of a qualified debt or equity investment can be
claimed, up to $10,000 in a single tax year, with a lifetime limit of
$50,000. Eligible businesses must have at least one full-time equivalent
employee and be majority owned by U.S. individual(s) that each earn
$100,000 or less per year ($200,000 in the case of joint filers).
142
S. 2738 is an encouraging first step in acknowledging the role the Code
could play in remedying the challenges WBOs face in accessing capital.
143
However, Congress needs more data on these issues, particularly with
respect to hearing from women business owners during committee
hearings.
In view of Congress’ additional investments in tax expenditures targeted
to small businesses in connection with TCJA, there is an even greater
urgency for congressional tax-writing committees to conduct oversight and
request tax research regarding WBOs use of tax expenditures post tax
reform.
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The existing absence of data and research on these issues “is
contrary to recent congressional efforts to engage in evidenced-based
policymaking.”
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To that end, at a minimum, the congressional tax-
writing committees should consider implementing the following
recommendations to gain a better understanding of how small business tax
expenditures impact women-owned businesses:
1. Hold hearings to consider the impact of Code’s small business tax
expenditures on women-owned small businesses;
142. Id.
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144. 2019 TAX REFORM BUDGET HEARING, supra note 33, at 3 (statement of
Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University)
(discussing lack of data for women-owned firms and information in footnote 13);
Expanding Opportunities for Small Businesses Hearing, supra note 83, at 6 (statement
of Caroline Bruckner, Executive-in-Residence, Accounting and Taxation Managing
Director, Kogod Tax Policy Center Kogod School of Business, American University)
(discussing the need for Congress to conduct oversight and research on the impact of
tax expenditures on women-owned businesses); see Peter G. Pupke, Minnesota
Governor Signs Omnibus Tax Bill Updating IRC Conformity, Reducing Income Tax
Rate, and Enacting Other Changes, J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 32, 35 (2019) (discussing
how the TCJA affects women-owned businesses).
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2. Task the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) with
preparing a report detailing recommendations on how Treasury, IRS,
SBA and JCT can coordinate to develop the data needed to prepare an
assessment of the distribution of existing small business tax business
with respect to WBOs. GAO’s recommendations should include
discussions of and recommendations on protecting taxpayer privacy data
in connection with using tax return information to develop the necessary
data;
3. Develop voluntary witness disclosure statements for individuals
testifying before the tax-writing committees. Such statements should ask
witnesses to volunteer information with respect to their gender, race,
ethnicity, and veteran status;
4. Amend the tax-writing committee rules to require staff include
voluntarily-provided demographic data of witnesses testifying before the
committees in EOC reports and in hearing transcripts; and
5. Charge the JCT with preparing a formal estimate of the distribution
of the revenue loss of small business tax expenditures with respect to
women business owners.
Looking forward to the 117th Congress, members of the JCT,
specifically the Chair and Vice Chair, should draft language for adoption at
the organizational meeting of JCT in the 117th Congress that mandates JCT
include distributional analysis of all business tax expenditures with respect
to women-owned firms, together with its revenue estimates for publication.
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress has a billion dollar blind spot when it comes to women
business owners and small business tax expenditures, which is not
surprising, considering that the committees charged with oversight of tax
issues have yet to fully investigate or consider how the Code impacts
women business owners. In fact, the tax-writing committees have yet to
hold a hearing on these issues. But just as concerning as the notable
absence of any tax-writing committee hearing on women business owners
is the persistent underrepresentation of women as witnesses before the
committees altogether. Although women-owned firms have grown
exponentially in number in recent decades to now number almost thirteen
million (42 percent of all U.S. firms in 2019), the overall participation of
women as witnesses at tax-writing committee legislative hearings remains
disproportionately low. In fact, no women testified at 45 percent of the
total tax reform hearings the tax-writing committees held during the 110th
through the 115th Congresses. Although women did testify at more than
half of the total tax reform hearings, women represented only 17.5 percent
of the total 462 witnesses who testified. The absence of women testifying
before the tax-writing committees was not limited to hearings on tax
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reform; from the 110th through the 115th Congresses, of the 3,627
witnesses who testified at 834 legislative, oversight, or investigative
hearings the tax-writing committees held, more than 75 percent were men.
But more stunningly: women did not testify at all at 332 (almost 40
percent) of the hearings the tax-writing committees held during this period.
Data is not (yet) available as to the number of women of color who testified
before these committees, but given the existing data on women’s
representation as witnesses, it is unlikely that it would reflect the fact that
women of color account for 50 percent of all women-owned businesses.
The consequence of failure to solicit testimony from women generally
and develop data on how tax expenditures impact WBOs specifically is
nothing short of a doubling down on a billion dollar blind spot. Congress
does not have the data or testimony to determine whether money it spends
through tax expenditures helps these small businesses access capital as
intended. This is most vividly illustrated by JCT’s estimates on the
distribution of the revenue loss for Section 199A showing that more than
90 percent of the revenue will go to firms with revenues greater than
$100,000. Similarly, existing tax research on WBOs indicates that women-
owned firms claim Section 179 at significantly lower rates than existing
government research finds for small firms generally. Section 179 is one of
the most expensive small business tax expenditures in the Code and will
now cost taxpayers almost $60 billion in the coming years, and yet
Congress does not have research regarding the benefits to women business
owners. At the same time, what government research that does exist
reiterates the ongoing challenges WBOs face growing their revenue and
accessing capital.
In the wake of the economic devastation triggered by COVID-19, there
is an even greater urgency for Congress to invest in firms and to consider
what levers exist in the Code to help businesses recover. As part of that
process, Congress needs to consider the specific challenges women-owned
firms have accessing capital to aid in their recovery. Failure to consider
these issues could fundamentally undermine congressional intent to help
these small businesses survive.
